

R 212121Z OCT 85
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3137
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 TEL AVIV 15214

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: [PTER](#) [IS](#) [US](#)

SUBJECT: ISRAELI WHITE PAPER ON PLO OUTLOOK AND GOALS

[1](#)1. THE GOI HAS LAUNCHED AN EXTENSIVE PUBLICITY CAMPAIGN TO DOCUMENT THE GOALS AND METHODS OF THE PLO. MFA SOURCES HAVE PROVIDED US WITH A PAPER ON "THE PLO'S OUTLOOK AND GOALS IN THE WAKE OF THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT" WHICH IS BEING MADE PUBLIC AS PART OF THAT CAMPAIGN. THE TEXT IS BELOW IN PARA

[1](#)2. KEY POINTS (SUPPORTED BY QUOTATIONS FROM PLO SOURCES) ARE:

- -- ARAFAT'S GOALS IN THE FEBRUARY 11TH AGREEMENT ARE DESCRIBED AS:

- -- PREVENTING HUSSEIN FROM ENTERING THE PEACE PROCESS ON HIS OWN.

- -- PREPARING THE GROUND FOR A RETURN OF THE PLO TO JORDAN.

- -- ACHIEVEMENT OF U.S. RECOGNITION WITHOUT ACCEPTANCE OF 242 AND 338.

- -- THE FEBRUARY 11TH AGREEMENT "DOES NOT DEVIATE FROM PLO POLICY".

- -- THE PLO'S GOAL REMAINS "THE DESTRUCTION OF ISRAEL".

- -- "THE ARMED STRUGGLE" REMAINS CENTRAL TO PLO POLICY.

- -- THE PLO REJECTS JORDANIAN INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FEBRUARY 11TH AGREEMENT.

- -- THE PLO SEES "LAND FOR PEACE" AS ONE STAGE, LEADING TO THE EVENTUAL DESTRUCTION OF ISRAEL.

[1](#)2. BEGIN TEXT:

"CHAPTER 1: THE POLITICAL DIMENSION - THE PLO'S OUTLOOK AND GOALS IN THE WAKE OF THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT (11 FEB 1985)

THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT AND ITS MEANING AS VIEWED BY THE PLO

[1](#)1. ARAFAT SIGNED THE AGREEMENT WITH HUSSEIN FOR THREE PRIMARY REASONS:

[1](#)A. TO ENSURE THAT HUSSEIN WOULD NOT ENTER INTO SEPARATE NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL;

[1](#)B. TO PREPARE THE GROUND FOR THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF A PLO PRESENCE IN JORDAN, FROM WHENCE THE ORGANIZATION WAS EXPELLED IN 1970.

[1](#)C. TO WIN US RECOGNITION, WITHOUT HAVING TO ACCEPT THE US' PRECONDITIONS, NAMELY, ACCEPTING UN RESOLUTION 242 AND RECOGNIZING ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST, AND TO ACHIEVE US AGREEMENT TO THE CONVENING OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE AT WHICH THE PLO WILL HAVE A STATUS EQUAL TO THAT OF THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS.

THE EXPULSION OF THE TERRORISTS FROM LEBANON, INITIALLY BY THE IDF AND LATER BY SYRIA, BROUGHT THE PLO TO ONE OF THE LOWEST POINTS IN ITS HISTORY; NOT ONLY WERE PLO MEMBERS DISPERSED THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST, BUT WHEN ARAFAT WANTED TO CONVENE THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL, HE HAD A DIFFICULT TIME FINDING AN ARAB COUNTRY WILLING TO HOST IT AND, IN THE END, ONLY JORDAN AGREED TO DO SO. FOR ARAFAT, THE AGREEMENT WITH HUSSEIN THEREFORE MEANS FIRST AND FOREMOST THE RETURN OF THE TERRORISTS TO JORDAN AND THE GRADUAL STRENGTHENING OF THEIR PRESENCE THERE, WITH THE INTENTION BEING THAT JORDAN SERVE AS A BASE FOR INCREASED TERRORIST ACTIVITY AGAINST ISRAELI TARGETS, FOR THE INCITEMENT OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE TERRITORIES AGAINST ISRAELI RULE, AND FOR THE STRENGTHENING OF THE PLO'S POSITION IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA. IN HIS BOOK, 'THE JORDANIAN AGREEMENT', WHICH WAS PUBLISHED IN AMMAN IN JULY 1985, KHALED AL-HASSAN, HEAD OF THE INFORMATION DIVISION OF 'FATAH', SPEAKS OF THIS GOAL:

- 'THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE TO THE RETURN OF THE PLO TO AN AREA WHICH BORDERS ON THE HOMELAND, AND TO AN ESCALATION OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE, WHICH IS ONE OF THE FIXED PRINCIPLES OF THE PALESTINIAN ACTION STRATEGY. THE ONLY POSSIBLE PLACE IS JORDAN, SINCE THE BORDERS OF EGYPT, SYRIA, AND LEBANON HAVE BEEN CLOSED FOR REASONS WHICH THERE IS NO NEED TO GO INTO. THE RETURN TO JORDAN IS A STRATEGIC INTEREST AND NEED OF BOTH PALESTINE AND JORDAN. THE RETURN TO JORDAN NECESSITATES AN AGREEMENT TO ORDER RELATIONS (BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES??)'.

12. THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT CONTAINS NEITHER CONCESSIONS NOR MODERATION ON BASIC PLO POSITIONS. IN OTHER WORDS, THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT DEVIATE FROM PLO POLICY AS APPROVED BY THE ORGANIZATION'S AUTHORIZED INSTITUTIONS - AND ESPECIALLY THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL - AND AS ENSHRINED IN THE DECISIONS OF THE ARAB SUMMITS. INDEED, A STATEMENT WHICH THE PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ISSUED ON 18 FEBRUARY 1985, AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT, SAID THE FOLLOWING:

- 'THE JOINT ACTIVITY OF JORDAN AND THE PLO IS BASED ON PALESTINIAN LEGITIMACY - WHICH IS EXPRESSED IN THE DECISIONS OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL, ESPECIALLY AT ITS 16TH AND 17TH SESSIONS, ON ARAB LEGITIMACY - WHICH IS EXPRESSED IN THE DECISIONS OF THE ARAB SUMMITS, IN PARTICULAR RABAT AND FEZ, AND ON INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY - WHICH IS EXPRESSED IN THE DECISIONS OF THE UN.'

SINCE THIS STATEMENT WAS PUBLISHED, SIMILAR DECISIONS HAVE BEEN ADOPTED BY A NUMBER OF PLO AND 'FATAH' INSTITUTIONS.

13. THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT HAS NOT PRODUCED ANY CHANGE IN THE PLO'S STRATEGIC AIM, WHICH REMAINS THE DESTRUCTION OF ISRAEL AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A 'DEMOCRATIC, SECULAR' STATE ON ISRAEL'S RUINS, WITH THE ACHIEVING OF THIS AIM BEING CARRIED OUT IN STAGES. EVIDENCE FOR THIS CAN BE FOUND IN THE DECLARATIONS OF THE AL-HASSAN BROTHERS, CONFIDANTS OF ARAFAT:

1A. HANI AL-HASSAN, ARAFAT'S POLITICAL ADVISOR: 'AS LONG AS THE PALESTINIAN DEMOCRATIC STATE HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED ON ALL OF PALESTINE, THERE CAN BE NO ABSOLUTE AND FINAL SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. I AM SPEAKING ALSO OF THOSE LANDS WHICH WERE PALESTINIAN BEFORE 1948, FROM THE RIVER TO THE SEA; THIS IS THE STRATEGIC GOAL. CLEARLY, SUCH A GOAL IS NOT ATTAINED ALL AT ONCE, BUT RATHER IN STAGES.' (AL-SAYAD, 15.4).

1B. KHALED AL-HASSAN: 'THE CONFLICT IS LONG AND ALL-ENCOMPASSING, AND ITS OUTCOME WILL BE DETERMINED

ONLY BY THE ELIMINATION OF EITHER ARAB NATIONALISM, OR ZIONISM. THERE IS A CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THESE TWO MOVEMENTS, WHICH CAN ONLY BE RESOLVED THROUGH THE ELIMINATION OF ONE OF THEM. HOWEVER, SINCE WE SEE NO POSSIBILITY OF QUICKLY ACHIEVING THE FINAL AIM, WE OPERATE THROUGH THE POLICY OF STAGES, UPON WHICH THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL DECIDED IN 1974' (AL-ANBA, KUWAIT, 24.5).

--

14. THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT HAS PRODUCED NO CHANGE IN THE PLO'S VIEW OF TERROR, WHICH IT REFERS TO AS THE 'ARMED STRUGGLE'. FOR EXAMPLE:

- 1. HANI AL-HASSAN: 'THE ARMED STRUGGLE SOWS, AND THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE REAPS, AND HE WHO SOWS NOT, REAPS NOT' (RADIO MONTE CARLO, 16.3).
- 2. NABIL SHA'AT MEMBER OF THE 'FATAH' CENTRAL COMMITTEE: 'SOLELY POLITICAL SOLUTIONS CANNOT BE SOUGHT WITHOUT CONTINUING ARMED STRUGGLE' (ASH-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, 18.8).

15. MOREOVER, THE 'ARMED STRUGGLE' IS OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE; IT MUST BE CONTINUED, EVEN ESCALATED AS, FOR EXAMPLE:

- 1. ABU JIHAD, HEAD OF THE MILITARY ARM OF 'FATAH' AND RESPONSIBLE FOR WEST BANK AFFAIRS: 'THE CONDUCT OF SEA WARFARE BY PALESTINIAN FIGHTERS IS AN EXPRESSION OF THE FIRM DECISION TO CONTINUE AND ESCALATE THIS ARMED STRUGGLE, WHATEVER THE DIFFICULTIES MAY BE . . . POLITICAL ACTIVITY WAS NEVER AN OBSTACLE TO THE CONTINUATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITY, BUT RATHER A MEANS TO ADVANCE AND DEVELOP IT' (AL-ANBA, 24.2).
- 2. AHMAD ABD AL-RAHMAN, ARAFAT'S SPOKESMAN: 'THE REVOLUTIONARY MARCH WILL CONTINUE, DESPITE THE DIFFICULTIES AND OBSTACLES, IN ORDER THAT THE ARMED STRUGGLE ADVANCE WITH RANKS UNIFIED, AS THE ARMED STRUGGLE IS THE ONLY WAY TO PALESTINE. THERE IS NO OTHER ROUTE TO PALESTINE EXCEPT FOR ARMED STRUGGLE' (FILASTIN ATH-THAWRA, 16.3).
- 3. THE FATAH 'REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL': 'ARMED STRUGGLE IS THE PRIMARY FORM OF THE PALESTINIAN STRUGGLE TO REALIZE NATIONAL GOALS. ON THE BASIS OF THIS STRUGGLE, THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL HEREBY DECIDES TO APPROVE THE PLAN, WHICH WAS ACCEPTED BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, TO ESCALATE THE ARMED STRUGGLE IN THE OCCUPIED LAND' (CONCLUDING STATEMENT AT THE END OF DISCUSSIONS IN TUNIS, 6.4).
- 4. HANI AL-HASSAN: 'THE FUTURE WILL IN THE END PROVE THAT WE ARE CAPABLE OF CONTINUING THE ARMED STRUGGLE, BECAUSE IF WE ARE NOT, THEN NEITHER SHALL WE BE SUITABLE CLAIMANTS TO REPRESENT THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE' (ASH-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, 16.4).
- 5. ARAFAT: 'THE MOST RECENT GUERILLA ACTION, WHICH WAS CARRIED OUT OFF THE COAST OF PALESTINE (SINKING OF THE ATAVARIUS ???) WAS NOT THE LAST, RATHER IT CONSTITUTES THE BEGINNING OF A SERIES OF ADDITIONAL ACTIONS WHICH WILL HURT ISRAEL' (AL-RAI AL-'AM, 25.4).
- 6. KHALED AL-HASSAN: 'WHAT IS NEEDED TODAY IS A CHANGE IN THE SCOPE AND CHARACTER OF MILITARY ACTION INSIDE ISRAEL. I AM NOT CALLING FOR SIMPLY ANOTHER SUICIDE ACTION, RATHER, AN ACTION WHICH WILL HAVE A VERY MAJOR IMPACT ON THE ENEMY FROM THE MATERIAL, MORALE, ECONOMIC, AND SECURITY POINTS OF VIEW' (AL-ANBA, 12.6).
- 7. THE PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF 'FATAH': 'STEPS MUST BE TAKEN WHICH CAN LEAD TO THE CREATION OF SUITABLE CONDITIONS FOR THE INTENSIFICATION OF THE PALESTINIAN ARMED STRUGGLE, IN

ALL ITS FORMS, IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB LANDS' (DECISION AT THE CLOSE OF THEIR MEETING, 23.9).

15. THE JORDANIANS, AND IN THEIR WAKE THE AMERICANS AND EUROPEANS, INTERPRETED THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT AS A PLO CONCESSION ON SEVERAL CENTRAL POINTS:

- A. ITS APPARENT ACCEPTANCE OF UN RESOLUTION 242.
- B. ITS ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF 'LAND FOR PEACE'.
- C. ITS ABANDONING THE OPTION OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE.
- D. ITS CONCEDING THE RIGHT TO SOLE REPRESENTATION OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.

THE PLO REJECTS THESE JORDANIAN INTERPRETATIONS AND INSISTS THAT NO CHANGE HAS TAKEN PLACE IN ITS POSITIONS ON THESE ISSUES. FOLLOWING ARE THE CLAIMS AND COUNTER-CLAIMS:

- A. UN RESOLUTION 242
- (1) THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT DETERMINES IN SECTION 1: 'LAND IN EXCHANGE FOR PEACE, AS CITED IN THE UN RESOLUTIONS, INCLUDING THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS.'
- (2) IN HIS SPEECH BEFORE THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE ON 31.5, KING HUSSEIN SAID: 'THE PALESTINIANS ARE WILLING TO ACCEPT UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 . . . AS A BASIS FOR A SETTLEMENT.'
- (3) HOWEVER, THE PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, IN ITS APPROVING OF THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT (18.2), REJECTED RESOLUTION 242.
- (4) ARAFAT HIMSELF CONDITIONED THE ACCEPTANCE OF 242 ON AMERICAN RECOGNITION OF THE PALESTINIANS' RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION (INTERVIEW WITH THE 'WASHINGTON POST', 15.5). WHEN ASKED (BY A CORRESPONDENT FROM THE 'WALL STREET JOURNAL', 7.6), TO REITERATE KING HUSSEIN'S STATEMENTS ((2) ABOVE), HE RESPONDED: 'NO, NO I WON'T REPEAT IT. I'M NOT A MONKEY. I GIVE MY OWN POLITICAL DECLARATIONS'.
- (5) THE PLO DOES NOT ACCEPT THE ABOVE-MENTIONED CLAUSE OF THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT AS REFERRING EXPLICITLY TO 242, BUT RATHER TO ALL UN AND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS DEALING WITH THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, COLLECTIVELY. THUS, FOR INSTANCE, KHALED AL-HASSAN, SAID: 'THE REJECTION OF 242 AS THE ONLY BASIS FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION MOST DEFINITELY STILL EXISTS. BUT RESOLUTION 242, WHEN TAKEN TOGETHER WITH A SERIES OF OTHER DECISIONS, IS NOT TO BE REJECTED . . . ALL THESE DECISIONS TOGETHER MEAN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE, THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION, RETURN OF THE REFUGEES, AND RECOGNITION OF THE PLO' (AL-ANB, 11.6).

1B. 'LAND FOR PEACE'

(1) IN HIS SPEECH BEFORE THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE (19.3), TAHER AL-MASRI, THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, SAID: 'THE IMPORTANCE OF THE JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN AGREEMENT IS THAT IT OBLIGATES, PUBLICLY, THE PLO, FOR THE FIRST TIME, TO ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF 'LAND FOR PEACE'.

(2) HOWEVER, THE PLO'S INTERPRETATION OF 'LAND FOR PEACE' IS DIFFERENT THAN THE JORDANIAN INTERPRETATION. ABU JIHAD SAID THE FOLLOWING IN KUWAIT (18.5): 'THE PLO'S FUNDAMENTAL APPROACH TO

THE 'LAND FOR PEACE' QUESTION IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF JORDAN'.

(3) THE PLO DOES NOT SEE THE FORMULATION 'LAND FOR PEACE' AS SIGNIFYING AN EXCHANGE - MAKING PEACE WITH ISRAEL IN RETURN FOR GETTING BACK THE TERRITORIES - RATHER AS PART OF THE 'THEORY OF STAGES', THAT IS TO SAY THE CREATION OF A PALESTINIAN STATE ON ALL LAND FROM WHICH ISRAEL WITHDRAWS, AS A STEP TOWARD THE CREATION OF A SECULAR-DEMOCRATIC-PALESTINIAN STATE ON THE ENTIRE TERRITORY. THE PLO VIEWS THE FORMULATION 'LAND FOR PEACE' AS PARALLELLING DECISIONS OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL AND THE FEZ SUMMIT. THUS, ARAFAT SAID: 'LAND FOR PEACE - ON THIS THERE IS ARAB AGREEMENT AT FEZ' (ROZ AL-YUSUF, 12.5). KHALID AL HASSAN SAID THE FOLLOWING: 'EVERYONE WHO ACCEPTED THE DECISIONS OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL, AND THE THEORY OF STAGES, AND ALL WHO ACCEPTED THE FEZ DECISIONS, WHICH WERE APPROVED BY BY THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL (PNC), CANNOT OPPOSE THE SENTENCE 'LAND FOR PEACE', AS AT ITS HEART IS THE 'THEORY OF STAGES'' (AL-ANBA, 12.6).

1C. AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE

-- (1) THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT STATES (CLAUSE 3): 'THE PALESTINIANS SHOULD EXERCISE THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION, WHEN THE JORDANIANS AND PALESTINIANS MANAGE TO ACHIEVE THIS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF AN ARAB CONFEDERATION THAT IS INTENDED TO BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE TWO STATES OF JORDAN AND PALESTINE.'

-- (2) THE JORDANIANS PRESENT THIS CONFEDERATION NOT AS COMPRISING TWO INDEPENDENT STATES, RATHER AS A FEDERATION HAVING ONE SOVEREIGN, ONE ARMY, AND ONE GOVERNMENT, WHICH IN FACT MEANS THE PLO'S GIVING UP THE OPTION OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE.

-- (3) IN HIS SPEECH BEFORE THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE (19.3), JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TAHER AL-MASRI SAID: 'THE MEANING OF THE JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN AGREEMENT IS THAT THE PLO NO LONGER DEMANDS AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE'.

-- (4) HOWEVER, THE PLO PRESENTS THE CONFEDERATION AS BEING COMPOSED OF TWO INDEPENDENT STATES, WITH THE INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE HAVING TO COME INTO BEING 'BEFORE' THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONFEDERATION. THUS, KHALED AL-HASSAN SAID: 'THE CONFEDERATION WILL BE BETWEEN TWO SOVEREIGN STATES. A PALESTINIAN STATE WILL BE ESTABLISHED 'BEFORE' THE CONFEDERATION, EVEN IF THE CONFEDERATION IS ESTABLISHED FIVE MINUTES AFTER INDEPENDENCE' (COTIDIENNE DE PARIS, 25.3).

-- (5) THE PLO LEADERS EMPHASIZE THAT IN ADDITION TO THE AGREEMENT WITH JORDAN, HUSSEIN SENT A 'MEMORANDUM OF CLARIFICATION' ON 4.3, ACCORDING TO WHICH THE 'PALESTINIAN PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION RESIDES IN A UNITED STATE OF PALESTINE HAVING A CONFEDERAL CONNECTION TO THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN'.

-- (6) THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S DECLARATION THAT THE PLO GAVE UP THE OPTION OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE (SEE ABOVE, (3)), WHICH HE REPEATED AT A PRESS CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON (5.6), DURING HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO THE US, PRODUCED ANGRY REACTIONS FROM THE PLO:

- (A) ABU IYAD: 'ACCORDING TO THE KING'S DECISIONS, AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE MUST FIRST BE DECLARED, AND ONLY AFTERWARDS WILL THE CONFEDERATION WITH JORDAN BE ESTABLISHED' (REUTER, 6.6).

- (B) KADDOUMI: 'THE PALESTINIANS MUST REALIZE

THEIR RIGHT TO INDEPENDENCE AND SELF-DETERMINATION,
AND ONLY AFTERWARDS WILL THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE
DECIDE IF IT IS INTERESTED IN CONFEDERATION WITH
JORDAN' (IN STOCKHOLM, 6.6).

- (C) HANI AL-HASSAN: 'THE AMMAN AGREEMENT IS
EXCEEDINGLY CLEAR; IT SPEAKS OF ARAB CONFEDERAL UNION
BETWEEN TWO STATES -- JORDAN AND PALESTINE'
(AL-BIYADER AL-SIYASI, 15.6).

1D. PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION

(1) THE HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT STATES IN CLAUSE
5: 'PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE HELD WITHIN THE
FRAMEWORK OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, TO BE
ATTENDED BY THE FIVE UN SECURITY COUNCIL PERMANENT
MEMBER-STATES AND ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT,
INCLUDING THE PLO, WHICH IS THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE'S
SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE WITHIN A JOINT
DELEGATION -- A JOINT JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN
DELEGATION.'

(2) SOME SAW THE REFERENCE TO A JOINT DELEGATION AS
A DEVIATION FROM THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE FEZ SUMMIT
(1974), WHICH GRANTED THE PLO SOLE RIGHT TO REPRESENT
THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.

(3) BUT THE PLO REJECTS THIS REASONING AND INSISTS
THAT IT ALONE HAS THE RIGHT TO REPRESENT THE
PALESTINIANS. THE 'FATAH' CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S
'MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING' (20.3) SAID AS
FOLLOWS: 'THE PLO, AS A SOLE AND LEGAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, IS THE BODY
RECOGNIZED BY THE ARABS AND THE WORLD AS HAVING SOLE
LEGITIMACY TO NEGOTIATE WITHOUT GRANTING POWER OF
ATTORNEY, OR AGREEMENT, OR PERMISSION TO ANY OTHER
PARTY TO PARTICIPATE WITH IT IN REPRESENTING THE
PALESTINIAN PEOPLE IN ALL MATTERS."

END TEXT.

FLATEN